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Sarah Imhoff / Indiana UniversityIn his 1929 A Preface to Morals, American journalist and political philosopher
Walter Lippmann wrote, “Modern man who has ceased to believe, without
ceasing to be credulous, hangs, as it were, between heaven and earth, and is at
rest nowhere.”1 The secular Lippmann located the source of this feeling of
unmooredness in the particulars ofmodernity, where the religions of the past
were no longer credible, but men (and also, although not in an identical way,
women) still sought something to believe in. If the acids of modernity—in his
famous phrase—had dissolved the worldviews that made religions plausible,
they had not dissolved the human needs that religion had fulfilled.
Despite their otherwise often disparate outlooks, Felix Adler, Reform rabbi
turned founder of the Ethical Culturemovement, would have agreed. Unlike
Lippmannwho spokemainly to an elite that had already become cognizant of
the homelessness of their belief,2 Adler set out to convince his readers that
traditional religions had neither met the spiritual needs nor offered the
proper tools of moral cultivation in modern America. Likewise noting the
shortcomings of both “heaven” and “earth,” Adler wrote that both “the econ-
omist” and “the moralist” had “failed in the crisis. Humanity cried out loudly* I am indebted to Clark Gilpin, Loren Goldman, Kathryn Lofton, Eva Mroczek, and the
anonymous reader for their insight and suggestions. I am also indebted to Clark Gilpin formuch
more than the inspiration for this essay and formuchmore than space here allowsme to express.
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1 Walter Lippmann, A Preface to Morals (1929; New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999), 9.
2 In Preface to Morals, Lippmann made this thought explicit: “This is the first age, I think, in
the history of mankind when the circumstances of life have conspired with the intellectual
habits of time to render any fixed and authoritative belief incredible to large masses of men”
(12). Likewise, in a review of Harold Laski’s The Problem of Sovereignty, he called for political
concepts to be “reexamined as fearlessly as religious dogmas were in the nineteenth century.”
In making this comparison, Lippmann disclosed that he thought the most significant and
spectacular moments of discrediting religious “dogmas” had passed; quote in Heinz Eulau,
“From Public Opinion to Public Philosophy: Walter Lippmann’s Classic Reexamined,” Amer-
ican Journal of Economics and Sociology 15 (July 1956): 441.
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My Sons Have Defeated Meenough through its depths, but neither had an adequate answer.”3 These two
men, the secular Lippmann who downplayed his Jewish heritage and the reli-
gious reformer Adler, both diagnosed American society with the same illness:
the culture lacked a convincing account of who or what heldmoral authority.
The question of the location of moral authority—written scripture or oral
teaching, individual or communal, in the celestial or earthly realms—has
recurred throughout Jewish and Christian history. A well-known Talmudic
story encapsulates the way traditional rabbinic culture conceptualized this
problem but also helps shed light on some of the questions about moral
authority that plagued Jewish thinkers of all stripes, such as Lippman and
Adler, into the modern, secularizing age. In the story, Rabbi Eliezer and the
other rabbis have a disagreement about whether or not a certain oven is
ritually pure. In order to demonstrate the correctness of his position, Eliezer
calls out to heaven three times, and three miracles occur.4 The other rabbis
refuse to accept thesemiraculously uprooted carob trees, reversed rivers, and
leaning study-house walls as valid halakhic (legal) arguments. Finally a heav-
enly voice says, “Why do you dispute with Eliezer when the halakhah agrees
with him?” Rabbi Joshua retorts, “God gave us the Torah at Sinai. We pay no
attention to heavenly voices because we follow the Torah, where you wrote:
incline after the majority.” Sometime later, a rabbi met Elijah and asked him
about the incident: “What did the Holy One, Blessed be He, do that time we
had that big disagreement over the oven?” Elijah told the rabbi, “God
laughed and said: ‘My sons have defeated Me, My sons have defeated Me.’”
The laughter hints that God knew both the futility and the power of Joshua’s
move. Although humans seemed to have grabbed religious authority for
themselves, they would always find this authority slipping through their own
fingers. If religious law resided on earth, and human decision making
trumped divine decree, then humans would have to come face to face with
a staggering level of moral responsibility and continually renegotiate reli-
gious authority.
Eliezer, of course, was not so easily defeated. Although Joshua’s position
won out in the midrash, the history of Judaism has been much more com-
plicated. The age-old contest between Eliezer to Joshua describes an endur-
ing set of options, which many generations have engaged. What made this
question seem so pressing—and so distinctive for Lippmann and Adler in the3 Felix Adler, The Reconstruction of the Spiritual Ideal (Hibbert Lectures) (New York: Appleton,
1924), 3.
4 Baba Metzia 59a–b. The issue seems to be about an oven made of separate tiles rather than
one large piece. Eliezer holds that because neither the individual tiles nor the sand between
them is a utensil, the oven is not liable to impurity. The other sages say that the structure as a
whole is a utensil because of its unified exterior, and therefore it is subject to impurity. Many
scholars have interpreted this text in its rabbinic context. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rubenstein, Talmudic
Stories (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 34–63; Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality
and the Reading of Midrash (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 33–34; Susan
Handelman, Slayers of Moses (Albany: SUNY Press, 1982), 40–41; David Stern “Midrash and
Indeterminacy,”Critical Inquiry 15 (1988): 132–62.
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The Journal of Religion1920s? I argue that two dramatic cultural developments lent particular ur-
gency to the question: the GreatWar and its aftermath, and women’s suffrage
and rights. The sheer scale of the first war—with the number of developed
countries, sizable armies, and newly destructive military technologies—
forced humans to consider how fully they held the power of life and death.
Persistent discourse about women’s rights and suffrage compelled Americans
to consider the foundations of their ideas about gender roles. Were women
political beings? Domestic selves? Inherently more moral than men? And
where did they look to know the answers?
The connection between these seemingly incommensurable thinkers dem-
onstrates how the dramatic cultural events of war and women’s rights focused
attention on the shifting sands of moral authority. In these texts, Lippmann
and Adler both want to leave Judaism behind (although in different ways and
for different reasons), but in doing so they must struggle with the evapora-
tion of any solid external locus of moral authority.
Lippmann and Adler were surely not the only thinkers considering the
issue of moral authority in the early twentieth century. Other American
Jewish intellectuals, especially those who were religious, also struggled with
the implications of Torah lo be-shamayim he (Torah is not in heaven). There
were the Reform rabbis who had celebrated the scientific study of the Bible as
a product of humans. These rabbis embraced the freedom to discern ethical
acts without being beholden to every facet of scripture. There were also those
more traditional Jews who grappled with interpreting the authority of hala-
khah in the context of modernity. Walter Lippmann and Felix Adler, two of
Rabbi Joshua’s least likely intellectual heirs, also found themselves pondering
questions about the locus of moral authority, if not through the medium of
rabbinic texts. As Jews who rejected normative Judaism, Lippmann and Adler
nevertheless occupied themselves with the task of locating moral authority in
a universe where the Torah was decidedly not in heaven. In the 1920s, both
embarked on journeys to find secular moral authority that was both philo-
sophically and practically germane to American life.
The intellectual biographies of the two men could hardly have been more
different. Adler was seventy-two years old when he published The Reconstruc-
tion of the Spiritual Ideal in 1923. He was the son of the famous German rabbi
Samuel Adler, and his family assumed he would grow up to follow in his
father’s footsteps. Instead the talented young Adler left Judaism after giving
his first sermon at his father’s large Reform synagogue, Temple Emmanuel in
Manhattan. Even though he no longer associated himself with Judaism, he
remained a major figure in New York religious circles through his Ethical
Culture movement.5 Adler had long felt that the time of the universal moral
utility of the bible had passed, but he still sought to create a spiritual5 Benny Kraut focuses on religious thought and development in his biography of Adler;
From Reform Judaism to Ethical Culture: The Evolution of Felix Adler (Cincinnati: Ktav, 1979).
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My Sons Have Defeated Mecommunity that would look to a variety of traditional texts for usable ideas.6
Even given his rejection of Judaism, Adler and his thought played a signifi-
cant role in Jewish religious thought and dialog in the United States.
Lippmann was of a younger generation than Adler; he was thirty-three
years old when Public Opinionwas published in 1922. Lippmann was born into
a middle-class German Jewish family in America and became a bar mitzvah,
but he sought to downplay his Jewishness at every turn and studiously avoided
association with other groups of Jews. Even though he attended Harvard, he
supported its notorious Jewish quotas. On the rare occasion he broached the
topic of Jews in print, he located the fundamental factor not in “Henry Ford
or any real belief in the nonsense about world conspiracy and the so-called
‘protocols,’” nor in theological or economical realms. Rather, the “real
fountain of anti-Semitism” was “the rich and vulgar and pretentious Jews of
our big American cities,” according to Lippmann.7 In addition to his feelings
about Jews, Lippmann generally saw the influence of religious institutions
declining, a situation he considered inevitable.8 As bastions of tradition, they
were holding onto amodel ofmoral authority that could no longer hold sway
with modern men and their experience. His training at Harvard launched
him into the orbit of the philosophers William James, George Santayana, and
Graham Wallas. His professional training came largely in the field of jour-
nalism and politics, where he sought to influence the American intellectual
and political climate through his essays, columns, and work with politicians.9
In the historiography, Lippmann sits among political philosophers, jour-
nalists, and public intellectuals.10 Adler occupies a place in the narratives of
liberal and reformist American religious traditions, Progressivism, and liberal
Judaism.11 While Adler maintained deep relationships within the Jewish6 In 1905, Adler wrote: “The Bible used to be in the old days all-sufficient . . . , and it still is,
in part at least, an admirable aid for those who know how to use it.” Adler believed that for the
modern person, the bible served the same purpose as texts by the Stoics, Emerson, Goethe,
and others. That is, they were aids to help individuals and communities know and create
moral lives; Felix Adler, The Essentials of Spirituality (New York: Pott, 1905), 15.
7 Walter Lippmann, “Public Opinion and the American Jew,” American Hebrew (April 14,
1922): 575.
8 “They [the churches] come down to us with a tradition that the great things are permanent,
and theymeet a population that needs above all to understand themeaning and thedirectionof
change. No wonder their influence has declined, no wonder that men fight against the little
influence they have”;Walter Lippmann,Drift andMastery: An Attempt to Disguise the Current Unrest
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986), 93.
9 The definitive biography of Lippmann is Ronald Steel’s Walter Lippmann and the American
Century (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1999). Steel deals extensively with Lippmann’s
intellectual relationships with the three men.
10 Steel’s preface, for instance, does not mention Lippmann’s Jewishness, although he does
discuss it in the body of the work, mainly in connection with Lippmann’s childhood. Barry
Riccio discusses Lippmann’s Jewishness briefly, and then it is only to indicate Lippmann’s
discomfort with Jewish identity and distance from what he saw as Jewish concerns; Walter
Lippmann: Odyssey of a Liberal (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), 1–2, 175.
11 Adler’s biographer’s place him in the realms of religious thought and reform, in both
American and Jewish contexts; Kraut, From Reform Judaism to Ethical Culture; Howard Radest,
539
The Journal of Religioncommunity throughout his life and held Ethical Culture lectures on Sundays
to allow religious Jews to attend, Lippmann’s contentious relationship with
Judaism occasionally bordered on self-loathing.12 He refused to lecture to
Jewish groups, turned down an award from the Jewish Academy of Arts and
Sciences, and had very few Jews among his close interlocutors. Psychiatrist
Carl Binger suggested that he feared any mention of Lippmann’s Jewishness
would jeopardize their friendship. His intellectual biographer Barry Riccio
claims that “many of his friends never even knew he was Jewish.”13
No record indicates that Lippmann and Adler ever met, although they
were both New Yorkers from 1911 until Adler’s death in 1933.14 These men
came from different backgrounds, ran in different circles, had very different
relationships to their Jewishness, and had career trajectories that took them
in quite different social and philosophical directions. Personally and profes-
sionally, they make odd bedfellows.
And yet the two spentmuch of their writing in the 1920s grappling with the
same issue. They each deemed both tradition and transcendence to be
inadequate sources of moral authority. Before the war, Lippmann had an-
nounced in a tone that was part celebration, part call to action: “Those who
went before inherited a conservatism and overthrew it; we inherit freedom,
and have to use it. The sanctity of property, the patriarchal family, hereditary
caste, the dogma of sin, obedience to authority—the rock of ages, in brief,
has been blasted before us.”15 Although his 1914 Drift and Mastery departed
from his 1913 Preface to Politics in its break from muckrakers and socialists, it
continued the assertion of a breakdown of tradition. Tradition had failedelix Adler (American Liberal Religious Thought) (New York: Lang, 1988). Texts on Reform
daism in America often mention Adler and reactions to him. For a sample, see Nathan
lazer, American Judaism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 49–51; Dana Evan
aplan, “Reform Judaism,” in The Blackwell Companion to Judaism, ed. Jacob Neusner and Alan
very-Peck (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 298; Michael Meyer, “American Reform Judaism and
ionism: Early Efforts at Ideological Rapprochement,” Journal of Israeli History: Studies in
ionism 7 (Spring 1983): 49–64; Kerry Olitzky, Lance Sussman, and Malcolm Stern, eds.,
eform Judaism in America: A Biographical Dictionary and Sourcebook (Westport, CT: Greenwood,
993). Shaul Magid’s forthcoming American Post-Judaism: Identity and Renewal in a Post-ethnic
ociety (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013) likewise positions Adler in a tradition ofF
Ju
G
K
A
Z
Z
R
1
S12 In his founding address in 1876, Adler indicated that Ethical Culture was not a religion
per se and therefore would not conflict with religious practice if participants still found ritual
meaningful. “We propose to entirely exclude prayer and every form of ritual. Thus shall we
avoid even the appearance of interfering with those to whom prayer and ritual, as a mode of
expressing religious sentiment, are dear”; Felix Adler, “Founding Address” (New York: New
York Society for Ethical Culture, 1876), 7.
13 Riccio briefly discusses Lippmann’s aversion to Jewish causes (as well as his own Jewish
identity) in the context of Lippmann’s disapproval of “tribal loyalty”; Walter Lippmann, 175.
14 In addition, both lent their names as councilmen to the American Proportional Repre-
sentation League, although it does not appear that either was particularly active in it. For one
listing of the councilmen, see Proportional Representation Review 32 (October 1914): 14.
15 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 16. In 1912 Lippmann had written in a similar vein, “The
institutions of the past are like the fresh eggs of the past—good while they are fresh”; William
Leuchtenberg, introduction to Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 4.
Jewish thought about religious and cultural reform.
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My Sons Have Defeated Mebecause it was simply no longer practical. Lippmann made this clear in his
brief introduction to Drift and Mastery, where he suggests that life would be
easier if we could simply rely on those who had come before us. If we had only
to learn and embody tradition, “it would be easy.” But, in his characteristically
snappy tone, Lippmann wrote, “It might work on the moon.”16 Having left
behind the shackles of tradition, Lippmann explained, modern men were
free to build their own convictions upon the great foundation of experience.
His exuberance would wane, however, and he would question the ability of
experience as the sole arbiter of morality.
Neither, however, was ultimately prepared to give in to utter moral relativ-
ism or nihilism. Indeed, after the war they saw the ill effects of unmoored
morality in a multitude of social processes. Even before the war, Lippmann
had tempered any enthusiasm for freedom from tradition with the grim
realization that “we have lost authority. We are ‘emancipated’ from an or-
dered world. We drift.”17 Adler wrote: “Should the idea of authority be
preserved? I say yes. Should it be reinterpreted? I say likewise, yes.”18 Al-
though he referred more narrowly to parental authority, the sentiment
provides a succinct statement of Adler’s wider philosophy.WAR
In the opening of his 1923 Hibbert Lectures, Adler warned: “The horror of
the recent war is still felt in our bones, and yet it seems as if mankind could
not take to heart themost drastic lessons, themost condign punishments. . . .
Above all there is one fact that strikes every observer: the so-called moral
forces seem to have failed in the great crisis through which the world is
passing. Religion was powerless to stay the carnage.”19 Americans, though
wounded by the trauma, could not assimilate the gory lessons into their lives
or future decisions; it seemed as though the war had taught them nothing.
For Adler, the war had laid bare a grim fact: Americans’ moral and ethical
systems were not up to the task of making sense of and alleviating the horrors
of armed conflict and death. Lippmann, too, expressed his deep disillusion-
ment in the peace process and its indications of the larger pitfalls of a
morality based in democracy and pragmatism.
Adler approached this crisis, like the rest of his thought, from a neo-
Kantian framework. The self was autonomous, each person gave herself the
moral law in concert with the rational, and each human was an end in
herself.20 Authority, then, was interior, and could not be deduced from
existing religious codes. He asserted: “The moral law is not derivative, it16 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 19.
17 Ibid., 111.
18 Felix Adler, Incompatibility in Marriage (New York: Appleton, 1930), 49.
19 Adler, Spiritual Ideal, 1–2.
20 Ibid., 31, 52.
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The Journal of Religioncannot be proven, it cannot be denied.”21 After the war had begun, but
before the United States had entered, Adler warned against confusing civili-
zation—of which religion and science were constitutive parts—with morality.
Civilization was merely a means to moral life, and as such it could fail at the
task. “Civilization, or the set of instrumentalities that serve the higher pur-
poses of life, may continue to exist without any longer being used for higher
purposes. The temples exist, but the religion that it taught in them becomes
obsolete or obsolescent.”22 He then asked, “What is wrong in our civilization as a
whole, what deep flaw penetrates it to its core, what is the radical cause that has
led to this universal strife?”23 His answer was that imperial nations had
mistaken instruments that constituted civilization for morality itself; the
“temples” still stood, but they had lost their authority.
After the war, a darker tone crept into Adler’s thought, and he talked of
“spiritual pain” and witnessing fellow human beings “stretching forth their
arms, sinking, drowning, and we are powerless to assist them.”24 Adler wrote
of postwar American society: “The time has come to reconstruct the moral
ideal with a view to giving it the power it lacks to grip men’s wills and more
adequately control their behavior.”25 Such a significant power to “grip”men’s
wills could only come from inside. Traditional religions had lost this grip
because their tenets were no longer plausible in the face of science and crises
like the war. Instead of calling on men to stop fighting, Christianity, Judaism,
and Islam had all become caught up in ideals external to their essences and
consequently encouraged the carnage, in Adler’s view.26
But it would be unfair to characterize Adler as focusing on the interior self
at the expense of interpersonal interaction. Whereas a traditional Kantian
might say that one person could be moral or ethical in isolation, for Adler,
persons could only come into the fullest sense of morality through human
interactions. This dimension of his thought helps to frame why the war was so
disheartening for him: both the war itself and its aftermath represented21 Felix Adler, Creed and Deed: A Series of Discourses (New York: Putnam & Sons, 1880), 80.
22 Felix Adler, The World Crisis and Its Meaning (New York: Appleton, 1915), 114. Science, for
Adler, had begun to be used as an instrument of militarism, violence, and immorality and
facilitated the atrocities of war. In this, what should have been the tool of science had been
mistaken for its own source of authority and its own end. See especially the title essay inWorld
Crisis.
23 Ibid., 120. Adler’s ultimate answer to these questions was that powerful western nations
(especially Germany and Great Britain) had mistaken civilization for morality and therein
justified the subjugation of “weaker races” and territories (120–45).
24 Adler, Spiritual Ideal, 11.
25 Ibid., 111.
26 Given its marginal place in American philosophy, it is surprising that Adler gave Islam a
place in his list. Perhaps in part because he sought to demonstrate the helplessness—and
even complicity—of all religions in the face of the war, Islam could serve as a negative
example. “Indeed, many of [religion’s] representatives fell in with the prevailing fury, and on
their part added fuel to the flames. Allah is said to have laughed aloud in his Mohammedan
heaven when the news came that Christian preachers on the one side were proclaiming a
Jehad or a holy war against their Christian brethren on the other side” (ibid., 2).
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My Sons Have Defeated Meinternational interaction in an unprecedented, widespread, and visible way.
After the war, he called for the formation of a “groupmorality,” calling it one
of the “needs of our own generation.”27 Like Lippmann, he insisted on the
importance of experience as the testing ground of morality (although both
thought that experience alone was inadequate). For him, the social or
collective sphere was the “laboratory” for the shaping of morality.28 The
trauma of the violence, the disappointment of the League of Nations, and
the subsequent concern about the failure of Wilsonian idealism all served as
outsized examples of the current conception of moral authority’s failure in
interpersonal realms. For Adler, the solution was the relocation of moral
authority to the individual, although one dimension of that authority was
always outwardly directed.
Lippmann, too, experienced profound disillusionment in the face of the
outcome of war, the Treaty of Versailles, and the United States’ refusal to join
the league. (Lippmann’s disillusionment was personal as well as philosoph-
ical: he was one ofWilson’s advisors and had helped draft his Fourteen Points
speech.) These events forced Lippmann to reevaluate the Jamesian pragma-
tism which he had earlier espoused. Whereas in his early career, he had faith
in the ability of individuals and collectivities to progress by experience, he
began to see the possible pitfalls of such a system.29 Widespread experience
or a democratically forged consensus could still be wrong or damaging, as he
made clear in his 1926 “Dogma of Majority Rule.”30 Expert opinion was still
opinion. He nevertheless remained an elitist and technocrat, and believed
that expert opinion, though not foolproof, was still superior to that of the
masses. In his 1922 Public Opinion, he complicated his former pragmatist
philosophy by suggesting that what might seem like experience was not
always pure. The press and the media in general could “manufacture” opin-
ions or consent.31 The same text brought the term “stereotype” into common
usage to describe the masses’ process of social cognition. But he did not27 Ibid., 47.
28 Felix Adler, An Ethical Philosophy of Life: Presented in Its Main Outlines (New York: Appleton,
1925), 341. The language of experiment and experience also reflects the influential work of
John Dewey, who was a colleague of Adler’s at Columbia University.
29 Although very early in his career, his work bore the mark of his teacher William James
most strongly, as time went on, he gravitated more toward George Santayana’s philosophy.
James’s idea of the experiential process of arriving and truth and morality struck Lippmann
more and more as moral relativism, and he began to seek a morality that could be grounded
beyond individual human experience and nevertheless harmonious with it. For a more in-
depth account of this phase of Lippmann’s thought, see Ronald Steel’s magisterial biography,
Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 12–32.
30 Lippmann explains the “primitive intuition of democracy” as “any opinion, any taste, any
action was intrinsically as good as any other. Each stands on its own bottom and guarantees
itself. If I feel strongly about it, it is right; there is no other test. There is no arbitrament by
which the relative value of opinions is determined. . . . Since no value can be placed upon an
opinion, there is no way in this philosophy of deciding between opinions except to count
them”; Walter Lippmann, “Dogma of Majority Rule,” in Men of Destiny (New York: Macmillan,
1927), 45–60, quotation at 54.
31 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1922).
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could prove an important critique of those individuals who portrayed them-
selves as ethical authorities. In Preface to Morals, he wrote: “The moralist is
irrelevant, if notmeddlesome anddangerous, unless in his teaching he strives
to give a true account, imaginatively conceived, of that which experience
would show is desirable among the choices that are possible and necessary.”32
The teaching of anyone claiming to be a moralist should be subjected to the
experiential scrutiny of pragmatism, not evaluated within some disembodied
and acontextual system.
In the wake of the war, Lippmann began to incorporate more of the
thought of his teacher George Santayana into his philosophy. Lippmann
held ideals derived from natural experience, not supernatural dicta, and
people create or hold onto these desires because of an aesthetic need to
make sense of the universe. Perhaps taking to heart Santayana’s aphorism
that “only the dead have seen the end of war,” Lippmann crafted an account
of the moral that would function in all worlds and contexts, not only an ideal
one. But this did not mean that locating the pragmatic moral process within
individuals doomed society to repeat its mistakes. Nor did it mean that the
moral man would be aloof. Combining James, Santayana, and Aristotle,33
Lippmann explained that modern Americans would grapple with their exis-
tential yearning for meaning by training themselves to engage virtuously with
the world around them. He wrote: “They have, therefore, to reeducate their
wants by an understanding of their own relation to a world which is uncon-
cerned with their hope and fears.”34
Lippmann articulated what he called “the schooling of desire.”35 As the
suffering of war and the manipulation of mass media continued to engulf
modern life,36 the serious person could no longer go on blithely believing in
a father-figure God, his short list of rules, or his assurance that the world was
really an orderly andmeaningful place. Therefore, Lippmannwrote,modern
man “can no longer count on possessing whatever he may happen to want.
And he must therefore learn to want what he can possess.”37
In his earlier years, Adler had tended toward optimism. He was progressive
both as a general philosophy of history and a specific political project. But as
the 1910s closed and the 1920s wore on, he began to lose patience with
“mere” reform and to espouse a darker account of the human condition.3832 Lippmann, Preface to Morals, 319.
33 Although he does not credit Aristotle, Lippmann’s account of how one “schools” her
desires has significant elements of Aristotelian ethics.
34 Lippmann, Preface to Morals, 320–21.
35 Ibid., 311.
36 Lippmann articulates this idea of manipulation and “the manufacture of consent” most
fully in Public Opinion, 248–52.
37 Ibid., 192.
38 Adler’s biographer Howard Radest has called it “almost existentialist” in tone and con-
tent. “Felix Adler,” in The Dictionary of Modern American Philosophers, ed. John Shook (Lon-
don: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), 28.
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My Sons Have Defeated MeLippmann’s thought had been a mix of optimism and pessimism, romantic
idealism and realpolitik, especially in his younger years. Yet especially in the
years immediately following the war, he, like Adler, found his social and
political critique taking on the tone of disillusionment. Adler and Lippmann
agreed on two fundamental points: society must have structure, and the
interpersonal self is the root of society. But the war had demonstrated the
instability of that structure and the profound volatility and fallibility of
interpersonal selves. The social changes associated with women’s rights
would do the same.WOMEN
As both the war and women’s rights movements showed, in moral authority’s
move from heaven to earth, the autonomy and chaos had become inextrica-
bly linked. In this way, Lippmann and Adler’s pessimism stemmed from the
same source as their optimism: humans could reconfigure moral authority,
but because they could,moral authority could never again be fixed. As he saw
both structures disintegrating, Lippmann created a strong analogy between
the father as the head of the household and traditional monotheism: nuclear
families had functioned “to make credible the idea that above the child there
is the father and above the father a king and the wise men, above them all a
heavenly Father and King. It is plain that any change which disturbs the
constitution of the home will tend profoundly to alter the child’s sense of
what he may expect the constitution of the universe to be. There are many
disturbing changes of which none is more important surely than the eman-
cipation of women.” When children no longer saw the father as the king of
the household, they would no longer be inclined to seeGod as the king of the
universe, Lippmann averred: traditional notions of God become “less and
less credible as women assert themselves. The child of themodern household
is soon made to see that there are at least two persons who can give him
orders, and that they do not always give him the same ones. This does not
educate him to believe that there is one certain guide to conduct in the
universe.” In short, overturning of women’s dependence on husbands was
not “conducive to belief in authority.”39
For Lippmann, like war, the emancipation of women threw into sharp
relief the crisis of authority. International relations, a global scene for politics,
and mass media had turned enclave societies into hubs of communication.
Women, as they were thrust from the home into the public sphere, would
experience this change all the more drastically. “I have tried to suggest what
this change from a world of villages has meant for politicians, clergymen, and
social thinkers. Well, for women, the whole problem is aggravated because39 Lippmann, Preface to Morals, 90–91.
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men experienced a transition from small, relatively isolated societies or
nations to international stages, women were torn from the home and thrust
upon those sprawling new stages.
In his 1914 Drift and Mastery, Lippmann had warned that women would
soon confront the same existential problems as men had: “The emancipated
woman has to fight something worse than the crusted prejudices of her
uncles; she has to fight the bewilderment in her own soul. She who always
took what was given to her has to fend for herself. She who passed without a
break from the dominance of her father to the dominance of her husband is
suddenly compelled to govern herself. Almost at one stroke she has lost the
authority of a little world and has been thrust into a very big one, which
nobody, man or woman, understands very well.”41 The swift transition of the
social position of women—from dependent to autonomous individual—
mirrored the slower transitions of modernity for all people. The bewilder-
ment of her soul would recapitulate the hollow feeling that had been creep-
ing up on men. The acids of modernity that had eaten through the fabric of
past moral authorities would leave women adrift, just as they had men.
Although he was in favor of women’s rights and suffrage, Lippmann
thought that feminists had identified the wrong site of their discontent.
Autonomy, which they requested in the form of rights, would itself be the
source of alienation, confusion, and a feeling of groundlessness. Upon
becoming emancipated, women would find what Lippmann already knew:
becoming one’s own moral authority could be alienating and confusing.
“When she begins to prescribe for herself, her problems begin,”42 he wrote.
Along with the “brave and brilliant atheists who have defied the Methodist
god and have become very nervous,” he lamented with characteristic irony,
“the women who have emancipated themselves from husbands, fathers, and
homes, and with the intermittent but expensive help of a psychoanalyst, are
now enjoying careers as interior decorators.”43 The independence that had
seemed so desirable would in reality turn out to entail a feeling of precari-
ousness and an existence without grounding, he warned. Like those who
“bravely” abandoned their religion suddenly to find themselves living an
unmoored existence, these women would experience the darker side of
autonomy.
Furthermore, these changes for women in turn signaled changes in society
at large. He noted two particular factors, “women’s economic independence
and birth control,”44 that had moved women closer to social locations that
allowed for self-determination. In both matters, he was moderate. More than40 Ibid., 219.
41 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 218–19.
42 Ibid., 214.
43 Lippmann, Preface to Morals, 6.
44 Ibid., 93.
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My Sons Have Defeated Mebeing wholeheartedly enthusiastic about the prospect, Lippmann simply
treated women’s emancipation as if it were inevitable; he preferred to evalu-
ate the effects he anticipated rather than offering his opinions on whether or
not the women’s movement should achieve its ends. “To insist that women
need to be moulded by authority is a shirking of the issue. For the authority
that has moulded them is passing.”45 Some of the results of this inevitability
would be positive, but he thoroughly disliked other effects he anticipated. He
lamented that women could or would work outside the home, for instance.
When he spoke of women’s “careers,” he often meant the idea of homemak-
ing as a domestic science, in line with other reformers and progressives of the
era. He opposed the legalization of the dissemination of birth control on the
grounds that doctors and nurses should be the only ones to convey such
information.46 In becoming less differentiated frommen, women also recon-
figured the family. Children would see not one authoritative figure—in
Lippmann’s view, an easy analogy for monotheism—but two independent
beings. The loss of the image of the family as analogous to humans’ relation-
ship to God would exacerbate the receding credibility of traditional religion
for the next generation.
In 1915, he wrote in a letter to the feminist Marie Jenny Howe, “In a rough
way one might describe feminism as a virtue made out of a necessity. Women
have to readjust their lives. The compulsion has made them dream various
ideals. They have pictured themselves as self-governing, self-respecting mem-
bers of a free community.” This necessity was the disappearance of the
traditional ordering of gender roles. “In other words,” Lippmann continued,
“the emancipation of women, which is at bottom the dumb product of social
conditions, becomes in a small minority a self-conscious purpose. Women
come to desire what they are compelled to be.” Forced to abandon structures
of authority, some women would convince themselves that freedom from
those structure was exactly what they desired. But Lippmann imagined that
the result for these women would not be happiness nor fulfillment because
“desires, theories, ideals always run ahead of the facts, and a good part of the
time they run directly against the grain of the facts.”47 Lippmann explained,
“Women have to live differently. Yet society is not decently ordered so they
can live differently. They go into industry because they are compelled to, but
they find that industry is not conducted so they can live sanely within it.” For
Lippmann, the transition into industry presented another case of what he45 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 125.
46 Letters to Mary Ware Dennett, February 4, 1916, and February 14, 1916, in John Morton
Blum, ed., Public Philosopher: Selected Letters of Walter Lippmann (New York: Ticknor & Fields,
1985), 36–37. Here Lippmann is aligned with Progressives—most famously Margaret Sanger—
who lobbied for reforming laws that would allow doctors (but not others) to disseminate
information about birth control.
47 Letter to Marie Hoffendahl Jenny Howe, February 16, 1915, in Blum, Public Philosopher,
20–21.
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The Journal of Religionhad identified in Drift and Mastery: women had “been the great routineers,”48
but with the passing of traditional modes of authority they would no longer
be. The experience of these women epitomized the drift that affected the
whole society: “Women are discovering . . . that there is a great gap between
the overthrow of authority and the creation of a substitute.”49 This gap
represented a void not only in the social structure, but also within the
individual. Lippmann diagnosed the “spiritual problem[:] We have lost
authority. We are ‘emancipated’ from an ordered world. We drift.”50 Drift
and autonomy were blood brothers.
Felix Adler offered a related diagnosis of modern malaise. Men already
experienced these existential difficulties, and women would only compound
their own troubles by seeking out similar rights. He characterized themalaise
as a threefold problem: the widespread “sense of insignificance . . . in this
wide universe,” the seemingly senseless suffering of the innocent, and the
problem of the “divided conscience.”51 In a typical example of this line of
reasoning, Adler explained his position on “woman suffrage” in a 1909
lecture, “I believe things are not what they seem. The ballot in the hands of
men is not doing what it should, and I would not like to have the evil we now
suffer increased by millions and millions of voters unprepared to exercise
suffrage.”52 Several years later, he opined, “The misfortune of the women’s
movement is that they have imitated men too much.”53
Women, Adler averred, are not the same as men, and current trends to
mistake them as such were spreading the ill: “Again, there should be warning
against an idea which is very common at present, under the influence of the
college education of girls and the emancipation of woman—the idea that in
the relation between the sexes, every attempt should be made to ignore sex
difference, and that men and women should meet just as men meet with
men, on the basis of comradeship. This idea I believe is, like that of romantic
love, a pernicious one.”54 Treating the like as unlike—that is, treating women
as men—would only lead to the spread of men’s problems rather than the
alleviation of women’s problems.
The reasons for Adler’s fears lay in his assumptions about the essence of
women and their role in society. He explained: “She is the factor of integra-
tion in human society as man chiefly is the factor of differentiation.”55 Like
Lippmann, who mocked the woman who “emancipated” herself from “hus-
band, father, and home,” Adler saw women’s rights as a drive toward an
individual autonomy that would have isolating consequences. Lippmann saw48 Lippmann, Drift and Mastery, 124.
49 Ibid., 126.
50 Ibid., 111.
51 Adler, Spiritual Ideal, 13–27.
52 “Felix Adler on Woman Suffrage,” New York Times, November 8, 1909.
53 “Women’s Part in Life as Dr. Adler Sees It,” New York Times, January 13, 1913.
54 Felix Adler, Marriage and Divorce (New York: McClure, Philips, 1905), 20.
55 Adler, Incompatibility in Marriage, 32.
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My Sons Have Defeated Methese consequences as most significant for individual women, who would
soon find that autonomy was not all they had imagined, whereas Adler
worried that if womenbecame likemen, then the world would be increasingly
a collection of individuals without social cohesion. Because American women
were becoming politically, economically, and vocationally more like men, ac-
cording toAdler, the crisis ofmoral authority would becomeonlymore acute.PESSIMISM AND PROGRESS
The locus of moral authority was not an idle question for Adler and Lipp-
mann. It informed the most pressing issues of their day. The issues of early
twentieth-century America certainly differed from those of the rabbinic sages,
but the midrash about Eliezer and Joshua suggests that locating moral
authority has been a perennial question in the tradition. Its dark postscript
illustrates the high stakes. Once the heavenly voice had spoken and capitu-
lated its authority to the rabbis, the other sages shunned Eliezer. They burned
everything he had ever declared pure, and they excommunicated him. That
day Rabban Gamliel, the leader of the rabbinic group that had shunned
Eliezer, was sailing, and an enormous wave loomed up and nearly drowned
him.He recognized it as a threat of punishment for his part in the shaming of
Eliezer, who also happened to be his brother-in-law. Ima Shalom, Gamliel’s
sister and Eliezer’s wife, recognized the precariousness of the situation. She
knew that if Eliezer prayed about the shame and hurt he had experienced
because of his excommunication, Gamliel would die. The wave had already
nearly killed him. So she prevented Eliezer from praying as long as she could.
One day, though, she brought bread to a beggar at the door, and returned to
find Eliezer pouring his heart out to God. At that moment, she knew her
brother Gamliel would be dead. Ima Shalom, it seems, saw the simultaneous
power and instability that an earthly moral authority entailed.
If the Torah is not in heaven, and moral authority resides on earth, the
stakes, as Lippmann and Adler knew well, are high. Eliezer, who was techni-
cally correct in his halakhic decision, was excommunicated and grieved.
Gamliel died for his part in the shaming. All this suffering resulted from a
case in which the men followed the proper decision-making procedures of
the study house. The episode demonstrates that a community creating and
following social rules would not constitute an answer in itself. Moral authority
may have lain with the rabbis, but as a result it gave them the tools to rend
their community asunder.
If men sought to find or create a moral authority, they might have looked
beyond themselves, such as the way that both Adler and Lippmann had
characterized Judaism andChristianity. They eachwrote thatHebrew religion
and the stories of Jesus had provided role models and valuable rules and had
been functional—even fulfilling—for premodern societies. But instead of
positing an authority beyond the self, Lippmann andAdler described amoral549
The Journal of Religionauthority within the self. To be sure the neo-Kantian Adler and pragmatic-
leaningLippmann differed in their prescriptions for amoral society, but their
diagnoses converged. Tradition and transcendence had both outlived their
usefulness and ability to compel humans. Pragmatism would claim that
experience should be the arbiter, and Kantianism would claim the sovereign
individual armed with his categorical imperative. But Lippmann had become
convinced of the pitfalls of the subjective criteria of experience, while Adler
critiqued Kantianism for ignoring interpersonal and experiential aspects of
the human condition. Both turned to an account of the individual, deeply
embedded in culture, as the place to ground moral authority. This interior
moral authority, which would be largely guided by experience, was anything
but foolproof. In fact, it needed to act and exercise itself in order to improve.
Lippmann and Adler both saw the possibilities—even inevitabilities—of
the errors and suffering that would occur in the high-stakes wager of locating
moral authority within human selves. If moral authority rested in human
individuals and the societies theymade, thenmoral and ethical faults also fell
squarely on those humans and their societies. No appeals to themysteries of a
god’s ways could explain conflict or death. Neither was enormously optimis-
tic about some immediate or revolutionary change, but both believed in the
possibility of progress. At least the war, women’s rights, and the disillusion-
ment of the 1920s had outlined their crisis.
So how could both men have such faith in progress, when they saw such
darkness in the culturally created people around them? They both bought
into the popular “scientific” narrative of general human progress from one
age to the next, and from the savage to the civilized.56 They also believed that
the evaluative process of pragmatism would slowly improve moral function-
ing, not only within each individual, but among and between social groups.
Lippmann and Adler rejected an “each man is an island” type of autonomy,
instead insisting that moral authority could dwell within the self, but that self
was always a social self, forever relating to others. If personal morality could
improve, then social morality would follow in time. The path to improve-
ment, however, would be paved with missteps and suffering, the inevitable
results of testing and continually recreating a human morality. But without
recognizing humanity as the locus of moral authority, the rest of history
would be doomed to repeat crises like the war and the darker side of women’s
emancipation without learning from the experiences.57 In the end, both the
progress and the suffering would be the results of a single observation: the
Torah is not in heaven.56 Thinkers as diverse as Freud, George Beard, and G. Stanley Hall all espoused varieties of
this narrative in psychological, developmental, anthropological, and other forms.
57 This viewpoint reflects Lippmann’s debt to Santayana. Although a fascination with
history permeates much of Santayana’s thought, his reflections are perhaps most articulated
in Dominations and Powers: Reflections on Liberty, Society, and Government (New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction, 1995), which he began writing during the first World War, set aside for thirty
years, and returned to during World War II, as he describes in his introduction to the volume.
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